

Severin Schroeder

# The Philosophy of Mind

Fakultät für  
**Kultur- und  
Sozialwissen-  
schaften**

---

Das Werk ist urheberrechtlich geschützt. Die dadurch begründeten Rechte, insbesondere das Recht der Vervielfältigung und Verbreitung sowie der Übersetzung und des Nachdrucks, bleiben, auch bei nur auszugsweiser Verwertung, vorbehalten. Kein Teil des Werkes darf in irgendeiner Form (Druck, Fotokopie, Mikrofilm oder ein anderes Verfahren) ohne schriftliche Genehmigung der FernUniversität reproduziert oder unter Verwendung elektronischer Systeme verarbeitet, vervielfältigt oder verbreitet werden. Wir weisen darauf hin, dass die vorgenannten Verwertungsalternativen je nach Ausgestaltung der Nutzungsbedingungen bereits durch Einstellen in Cloud-Systeme verwirklicht sein können. Die FernUniversität bedient sich im Falle der Kenntnis von Urheberrechtsverletzungen sowohl zivil- als auch strafrechtlicher Instrumente, um ihre Rechte geltend zu machen.

Der Inhalt dieses Studienbriefs wird gedruckt auf Recyclingpapier (80 g/m<sup>2</sup>, weiß), hergestellt aus 100 % Altpapier.

---

## CONTENTS

<b>INTRODUCTION OF THE AUTHOR</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>TEACHING GOALS</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>BIBLIOGRAPHY</b>	<b>8</b>
Abbreviations of works by WITTGENSTEIN .....	8
Works by other authors .....	10
<b>0 PREFACE</b>	<b>15</b>
<b>1 WHAT IS PHILOSOPHY?</b>	<b>16</b>
1.1 HUME and KANT .....	16
1.2 Philosophy as the quest for definitions .....	18
1.3 WITTGENSTEIN's conception of philosophy .....	21
1.4 Examples of philosophical problems .....	24
1.4.1 How can Socrates become smaller than Theaetetus? .....	24
1.4.2 How is it possible to measure time? .....	25
1.4.3 Where is the past? .....	25
1.4.4 How can one judge what is not the case? .....	26
1.4.5 How can one mistake one thing for another? .....	27
1.4.6 Where is the University? .....	27
1.4.7 Is the floor not solid? .....	28
1.5 Exercises .....	30
Exercise 1 .....	30
Exercise 2 .....	31

Diese Seite bleibt aus technischen Gründen frei!

Exercise 3 .....	31
Exercise 4 .....	31
<b>2    CARTESIAN DUALISM</b>	<b>33</b>
<b>3    WITTGENSTEIN'S PHILOSOPHY OF MIND</b>	<b>38</b>
3.1    The Inner-Object Model.....	38
3.1.1    Knowledge of other minds .....	39
3.1.1.1    The Idle-Wheel Argument.....	40
3.1.1.2    The concept of knowledge .....	42
3.1.1.3    The Ascribability Argument.....	43
3.1.1.4    Behaviour and deception.....	45
3.1.2    A sensation diary .....	46
3.1.2.1    The No-Criterion Argument .....	46
3.1.2.2    First-person authority .....	48
3.1.2.3    The concept of a bodily sensation.....	49
3.1.3    Exercise 5.....	51
3.2    The paradox of the instantaneous experience of complex contents ....	52
3.2.1    Sudden understanding .....	55
3.2.2    Meaning and understanding .....	56
3.2.3    Understanding and interpretation .....	58
3.2.4    The myth of mental representation.....	59
3.3    Thinking.....	62
3.3.1    Thought and language .....	63
3.4    Voluntary action.....	66

3.4.1	The inner-object model of voluntary action.....	66
3.4.1.1	First objection .....	66
3.4.1.2	Second objection .....	67
3.4.1.3	Third objection .....	67
3.4.2	The absence of surprise .....	68
<b>4</b>	<b>CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY OF MIND</b>	<b>70</b>
4.1	Mind and Brain .....	70
4.1.1	Is the mind identical with the brain?.....	70
4.1.2	Are mental states identical with brain states? (SMART) .....	71
4.1.2.1	KRIPKE's Objection.....	71
4.1.2.2	Another objection.....	74
4.1.2.3	Type-type identity and token-token identity.....	78
4.1.3	Supervenience.....	79
4.1.4	Eliminative Materialism (CHURCHLAND) .....	81
4.1.5	Exercise 6.....	90
4.2	Mind and Behaviour.....	91
4.2.1	Behaviourism.....	91
4.2.2	Functionalism .....	93
4.2.2.1	Objections to functionalism.....	94
4.2.3	WITTGENSTEIN, behaviourism and functionalism .....	98
4.2.3.1	PUTNAM's Super-Spartans .....	102
4.3	The Problem of Consciousness.....	104
4.3.1	Brain and consciousness.....	105

---

4.3.2	How does it feel? (NAGEL).....	109
4.3.3	Automata and zombies.....	114
4.3.4	Exercise 7.....	115
4.4	Can computers think? .....	116
4.4.1	The Chinese Room .....	117
4.4.2	Thinking and intentional action.....	121
4.5	Mind and Action.....	123
4.5.1	Volitions and trying .....	123
4.5.1.1	The Argument from Possible Intimidation (O'SHAUGHNESSY).....	123
4.5.1.2	The Argument from Divergent Cognitive Attitudes (HORNSBY)...	125
4.5.1.3	Conversational Implicature (GRICE).....	127
4.5.1.4	The concept of trying .....	128
4.5.1.5	Trying and succeeding .....	133
4.5.1.6	Conclusion.....	135
4.5.2	Reasons and causes .....	136
4.5.2.1	DAVIDSON's theory .....	136
4.5.3	Exercise 8.....	149

## 5 NOTES ON THE EXERCISES

150

## Introduction of the author

Severin Schroeder teaches philosophy at the universities of Oxford and Reading. His main research interests are the philosophy of Wittgenstein, the philosophy of mind, and aesthetics. He is the author of *Das Privatsprachen-Argument: Wittgenstein über Empfindung und Ausdruck* (Schöningh 1998), *Wittgenstein: The Way Out of the Fly-Bottle* (Polity 2006), and *Wittgenstein lesen: Ein Kommentar zu ausgewählten Passagen der "Philosophischen Untersuchungen"* (Frommann-Holzboog, forthcoming). He is the editor of *Wittgenstein and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind* (Palgrave 2001), and is currently editing a collection of articles on the philosophy of literature (Blackwell).



## Teaching goals

After having completed this course, the student

- should have an overview over a British tradition in analytical philosophy;
- gain an insight into some major problems in the philosophy of mind and some solutions proposed for these problems in the context of that tradition;
- be made familiar with Ludwig Wittgenstein's philosophy as an analytical tool in the philosophy of mind.

## Bibliography

### Abbreviations of works by WITTGENSTEIN

- AL** *Wittgenstein's Lectures, Cambridge, 1932-1935*, ed.: A. Ambrose, Oxford: Blackwell, 1979.
- BB** *The Blue and Brown Books*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1958; German transl. of *The Blue Book: Das Blaue Buch, Werkausgabe*, Bd. 5, Ffm 1989.
- BT** *The Big Typescript*, = TS 213, published as WA vol. 11; ch. 'Philosophie', 405-35 published and tr. in PO, 160-99.
- CE** *Cause and Effect: Intuitive Awareness*, in PO, 370-426. German ed. in: *Vortrag über Ethik*, Ffm 1989, 101-139.
- CV** *Culture and Value*, rev. ed., ed.: G.H. von Wright; tr.: P. Winch, Oxford: Blackwell, 1998.
- EPB** *Eine philosophische Betrachtung*, in: *Werkausgabe*, Bd. 5, Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp 1989; 117-282.
- LPP** *Lectures on Philosophical Psychology 1946-47*, Notes by P.T. Geach, K.J. Shah, A.C. Jackson; ed.: P.T. Geach, Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1988. German ed. as: *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Psychologie 1946/47*, Ffm 1991.
- LW** *Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology*, eds.: G.H. von Wright, H. Nyman; tr.: C.V. Luckhardt, M.A.E. Aue, Oxford: Blackwell, 1982. German ed. in: *Werkausgabe*, Bd. 7.
- LW II** *Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology. Vol. 2*, eds.: G.H. von Wright, H. Nyman; tr.: C.V. Luckhardt, M.A.E. Aue, Oxford: Blackwell, 1992. German ed. as: *Letzte Schriften über die Philosophie der Psychologie. Das Innere und das Äußere. (1949-1951)*, Ffm 1993.
- MS** Unpublished manuscript, numbered in accordance with von Wright's catalogue (1982).
- NfL** *Notes for Lectures on "Private Experience" and "Sense Data"* (1934-36), in PO, 202-88. German ed. in: *Vortrag über Ethik*, Ffm 1989, 101-139.

- OC** *On Certainty*, eds: G.E.M. Anscombe & G.H. von Wright, tr.: D. Paul & G.E.M. Anscombe, Oxford: Blackwell, 1961. German ed. as: *Über Gewissheit*, Ffm 1970.
- PG** *Philosophical Grammar*, ed.: R. Rhees, tr.: A.J.P. Kenny, Oxford: Blackwell, 1974. German ed. as: *Philosophische Grammatik* in: *Werkausgabe*, Bd. 4, Ffm 1989.
- PI** *Philosophical Investigations*, ed.: G.E.M. Anscombe & R. Rhees, tr.: G.E.M. Anscombe, Oxford: Blackwell: 1953. German ed. as: *Philosophische Untersuchungen* in: *Werkausgabe*, Bd. 1, Ffm 1984.
- PO** *Philosophical Occasions 1912-1951*, eds: J. Klagge & A. Nordmann, Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993.
- RFM** *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics*, eds: G.H. von Wright, R. Rhees, G.E.M. Anscombe; tr.: G.E.M. Anscombe, rev. ed., Oxford: Blackwell, 1978. German ed. as: *Bemerkungen über die Grundlagen der Mathematik*, in: *Werkausgabe*, Bd. 6, Ffm 1984.
- RPP** *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology*, 2 vols, eds.: G.E.M. Anscombe, G.H. von Wright, H. Nyman; tr.: G.E.M. Anscombe, C.V. Luckhardt, M.A.E. Aue, Oxford: Blackwell, 1980. German ed. as: *Bemerkungen über die Philosophie der Psychologie*, Bde 1 und 2, in: *Werkausgabe*, Bd. 7, Ffm 1989.
- TS** Unpublished typescript, numbered in accordance with von Wright's catalogue (1982).
- WA** *Wiener Ausgabe*, ed.: Michael Nedo, Vienna: Springer, 1993ff.
- WVC** *Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle*. Conversations recorded by Friedrich Waismann, ed.: B. McGuinness, tr.: J. Schulte & B. McGuinness, Oxford: Blackwell 1979. German ed. as: *Ludwig Wittgenstein und der Wiener Kreis*, in: *Werkausgabe*, Bd. 3, Ffm 1989.
- Z** *Zettel*, eds: G.E.M. Anscombe & G.H. von Wright, tr.: G.E.M. Anscombe, Oxford: Blackwell, 1967. German ed. as: "Zettel", in: *Werkausgabe*, Bd. 8, Ffm 1989.

## Works by other authors

- Anscombe, G.E.M. (1957), *Intention*, Oxford: Blackwell.
- (1971), 'Causality and Determination', in her *Collected Papers II: Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1981.
- Arnold, Wilhelm, Eysenck, Hans Jürgen, Meili, Richard (eds) (1980), *Lexikon der Psychologie*, 3 vols, Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder.
- St. Augustine, *Confessions*, tr.: E.B. Pusey, London: Dent, 1907.
- Ayer, A.J. (1936), *Language, Truth and Logic*, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1971.
- (1954), 'Freedom and Necessity', G. Watson (ed.), *Free Will*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., Oxford: OUP, 2002.
- Baier, A.C. (1985), 'Rhyme and Reason: Reflecting on Davidson's Version of Having Reasons', in E. LePore & B.P. McLaughlin (eds), *Actions and Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson*, Oxford: Blackwell.
- Baker, G.P. & Hacker, P.M.S. (1984), *Language, Sense and Nonsense*, Oxford: Blackwell.
- Bennett, M.R. & Hacker, P.M.S. (2003), *Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience*, Oxford: Blackwell.
- Blackburn, Simon (1994), *The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy*, Oxford: OUP.
- Blackmore, Susan (ed.) (2005), *Conversations on Consciousness*, Oxford: OUP.
- Bradley, F. H. (1893), *Appearance and Reality. A Metaphysical Essay*, London: Allen & Unwin.
- Carnap, Rudolf (1931), 'Psychology in Physical Language', *Erkenntnis*, Vol. 2.
- Chalmers, D.J. (1996), *The Conscious Mind*, Oxford: OUP.
- Child, W. (1994), *Causality, Interpretation and the Mind*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Churchland, Paul (1981), 'Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes', in: W. Lyons (ed.), *Modern Philosophy of Mind*, London:

- Everyman 1995 (first published in: *The Journal of Philosophy* 78, 1981).
- Crane, Tim, *The Mechanical Mind*, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1995
- Davidson, Donald (1963), 'Actions, Reasons and Causes', in his: *Essays on Actions and Events*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980.
- (1980), *Essays on Actions and Events*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Davies, S. (2001), 'Definitions of Art', in: B. Gaut & D. McIver Lopes (eds), *The Routledge Companion to Aesthetics*, London: Routledge.
- Dennett, Daniel (1991), *Consciousness Explained*, Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Descartes, René (1641), *Meditations on First Philosophy*, tr. J. Cottingham, Cambridge: CUP, 1986.
- (1637) *Discourse on the Method*, tr. J. Cottingham, Cambridge: CUP, 1985.
- (1644) *Principles of Philosophy*, tr. J. Cottingham, Cambridge: CUP, 1985.
- (1649), *The Passions of the Soul*, tr. J. Cottingham, Cambridge: CUP, 1985.
- Evnine, S. (1991), *Donald Davidson*, Cambridge: Polity.
- Glock, Hans-Johann (1990), 'Stroud's Defence of Cartesian Scepticism — A "Linguistic Response"', *Philosophical Investigations* 13.
- Gordon, Robert (1986), 'Folk Psychology as Simulation', in *Mind & Language* 1.
- Grice, Paul (1967), 'The Causal Theory of Perception', in: G.J. Warnock (ed.), *The Philosophy of Perception*, Oxford: OUP.s
- (1989), *Studies in the Way of Words*, Cambridge/Mass.: Harvard UP.
- Hacker, P.M.S. (1990), *Wittgenstein: Meaning and Mind. Vol. 3 of an Analytical Commentary on the 'Philosophical Investigations'*, Oxford: Blackwell.
- (1996a) *Wittgenstein: Mind and Will. Vol. 4 of an Analytical Commentary on the 'Philosophical Investigations'*, Oxford: Blackwell.
- (1996b), *Wittgenstein's Place in Twentieth-Century Analytic Philosophy*, Oxford: Blackwell.
- (2001), 'Eliminative Materialism', in: S. Schroeder (ed.), *Wittgenstein and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind*, Basingstoke: Palgrave.

- Hanfling, Oswald (1987), 'How is Scepticism Possible?', *Philosophy* 62.
- (2000), *Philosophy and Ordinary Language*, London: Routledge.
- Hornsby, Jennifer (1980), *Actions*, London: Routledge.
- (1997), *Simple Mindedness*, Cambridge/Mass.: Harvard UP.
- Hume, David (1739), *A Treatise of Human Nature*, ed.: L.A. Selby-Bigge, Oxford: OUP, 1888.
- (1748), *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, eds: L.A. Selby-Bigge & P.H. Nidditch, Oxford: OUP, 1975.
- Hyman, John (1991), 'Introduction', in his (ed.): *Investigating Psychology: Sciences of the Mind after Wittgenstein*, London: Routledge.
- James, William (1890), *The Principles of Psychology*, 2 vols, New York: Dover, 1950.
- Kant, Immanuel (1781), *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, Hg.: W. Weischedel, Wiesbaden: Insel Verlag, 1956.
- Kenny, Anthony (1971), 'The Verification Principle and the private language argument (ii)', in: O.R. Jones (ed.): *The Private Language Argument*, London: Macmillan.
- (1975), *Will, Freedom and Power*, Oxford: Blackwell.
- (1984), *The Legacy of Wittgenstein*, Oxford: Blackwell.
- (1989), *The Metaphysics of Mind*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Kripke, Saul A. (1972), *Naming and Necessity*, Cambridge/Mass.: Harvard UP.
- (1982), *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language*, Cambridge/Mass.: Harvard UP.
- Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm (1713), *Monadologie*, Reclam: Ditzingen, 1998.
- Locke, John (1689), *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, ed. P.H. Nidditch, Oxford: OUP, 1975.
- Malcolm, Norman (1971), *Problems of Mind: Descartes to Wittgenstein*, London: Allen & Unwin.
- McGinn, Colin (1991), *The Problem of Consciousness*, Oxford: Blackwell.
- Melden, A.I. (1961), *Free Action*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Mill, J.S. (1861), *Utilitarianism*, ed.: R. Crisp, Oxford: OUP, 1998.
- Morton, Adam, *Frames of Mind*, Oxford: OUP, 1980

- Moya, C.J. (1990), *The Philosophy of Action: An Introduction*, Cambridge: Polity.
- Nagel, Thomas (1970), 'Physicalism', in C.V. Borst (ed.), *The Mind/Brain Identity Theory*, London: Macmillan.
- (1974), 'What is it like to be a bat?', in his *Mortal Questions*, Cambridge: CUP. 1979.
- Nietzsche, Friedrich (1892), *Also sprach Zarathustra*, in: G. Colli & M. Montinari (eds), *Sämtliche Werke. Kritische Studienausgabe*, München: dtv, 1988; Bd. 4.
- O'Shaughnessy, Brian (1973), 'Trying (as the Mental "Pineal Gland")', in A. Mele (ed.), *The Philosophy of Action*, Oxford: OUP, 1997.
- (1980), *The Will. Vol. 2*, Cambridge: CUP.
- Pietroski, P.M. (1998), 'Actions, Adjuncts and Agency', in *Mind* 107.
- Plato, *Cratylus*, in: *The Dialogues of Plato*, Vol. III, tr. B. Jowett, Oxford: OUP, 1953; 41-106.
- *Theaetetus*, tr.: J. McDowell, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973.
- Putnam, Hilary (1965), 'Brains and Behaviour', in *Analytical Philosophy*, 2nd Series, ed. R.J. Butler, Oxford: Blackwell.
- (1973), 'Meaning and Reference', in *The Journal of Philosophy* LXX; reprinted in: S.P. Schwartz (ed.), *Naming, Necessity, and Natural Kinds*, Ithaca: Cornell UP.
- Rundle, B. (1997), *Mind in Action*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Russell, Bertrand (1921), *The Analysis of Matter*, London: George Allen & Unwin.
- Ryle, Gilbert (1949), *The Concept of Mind*, London: Hutchinson's University Press.
- Schopenhauer, Arthur (1859), *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, 2 Bde, Hg.: A. Hübscher, Wiesbaden: Brockhaus, 1949.
- Schroeder, Severin (2001a), 'Private Language and Private Experience', in H.-J. Glock (ed.), *Wittgenstein: A Critical Reader*, Oxford: Blackwell.
- (2001b), 'The Concept of Trying', in *Philosophical Investigations*, 24:3.
- (2001c), 'Are Reasons Causes? A Wittgensteinian Response to Davidson', in: S. Schroeder (ed.), *Wittgenstein and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind*, Basingstoke: Palgrave.
- Schulte, Joachim (1987), *Erlebnis und Ausdruck: Wittgensteins Philosophie der Psychologie*, München: Philosophia.

- Searle, John (1969), *Speech Acts*, Cambridge: CUP.
- (1984), *Minds, Brains & Science*, Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- (1992), *The Rediscovery of the Mind*, Cambridge/Mass.: MIT Press.
- Shanker, Stuart G. (2004), 'A picture held me captive', in E. Ammereller & E. Fischer (eds), *Wittgenstein at Work: Method in the 'Philosophical Investigations'*, London: Routledge.
- Shoemaker, Sydney (1984), 'The inverted spectrum', in his: *Identity, Cause and Mind: Philosophical Essays*, Cambridge: CUP.
- Smart, J.J.C. (1959). 'Sensations and Brain Processes', in: W. Lyons (ed.), *Modern Philosophy of Mind*, London: Everyman, 1995.
- Stegmüller, Wolfgang (1979), *Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. Eine kritische Einführung. Band II*, 6. Auflage, Stuttgart: Kröner.
- Stoutland, F. (1985), 'Davidson on Intentional Behaviour', in E. LePore & B.P. McLaughlin (eds), *Actions and Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson*, Oxford: Blackwell.
- Strawson, P.F. (1959), *Individuals*, London: Methuen.
- (1962), 'Freedom and Resentment', in his *Freedom and Resentment and other essays*, London: Methuen, 1974.
- (1974), 'Self, Mind and Body' , in his *Freedom and Resentment and other essays*, London: Methuen, 1974.
- Turing, Alan (1950), 'Computing Machinery and Intelligence', in Alan Ross Anderson (ed.), *Minds and Machines*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964.
- White, A.R. (1967), *The Philosophy of Mind*, New York, Random House.
- von Wright, Georg Henrik (1982), 'The Wittgenstein Papers', in his: *Wittgenstein*, Oxford: Blackwell.



## 0 Preface

In 1984 ANTHONY KENNY warned that ‘some of the philosophical gains we owe to Wittgenstein seem in danger of being lost’.

This is not because his work has been superseded or put in the shade by the light of some succeeding philosophical genius. Rather, his contribution has been neglected because more and more philosophers, especially in the United States, have attempted to model their studies on the pattern of a rigorously scientific discipline, mimicking the type of precision characteristic of mathematics, and holding up [...] an abstract system for artificial intelligence as the goal of philosophy of mind. [Kenny 1984, vii-viii]

KENNY’s admonition reads as apt and urgent today as it did 20 years ago. Ignorance or confusion about the peculiarity of philosophy vis-à-vis the empirical sciences and a striving for pseudo-scientific theory construction are still the order of the day, uncritically accepted by most contemporary introductions to the philosophy of mind. This course has been designed to offer to students a different approach to the subject, very much against the grain of current academic fashions. WITTGENSTEIN’s profound insights, which have lost nothing of their relevance to philosophical debates over the last sixty years, are taken as a starting point.

In order to avoid confusion in this area it is extremely important to have a clear grasp of the nature of a philosophical problem, as opposed to a scientific problem. This, therefore, is the topic of Chapter 1, which as a foundation to the rest of the course presents WITTGENSTEIN’s philosophical methodology, and, by demonstrating its application in a number of simple cases, affords the student some practical training in philosophical problem solving.

Chapter 2 contains a brief sketch of Cartesian Dualism, as a necessary background to WITTGENSTEIN’s own philosophy of mind, which is the topic of Chapter 3.

Chapter 4 then, by far the longest part of the course, examines major issues and positions in today’s philosophy of mind.