Bas van Fraassen

# Problems of Modern Empiricism 2nd, revised and enlarged edition

# Empirismus im XX. Jahrhundert 2. überarbeitete und ergänzte Ausgabe

Deutsche Übersetzung durch C. Beckmann - K. Biermann

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## Foreword

No Philosophy can today get around occupying itself with questions and problems of Empiricism. The present course by the Philosopher of Science Prof. van Fraassen of Princeton University shows this in a paradigmatic way. Thus, there was no doubt that this course which has been well received by the students over many years be included in the new Study Programs. That with this course a bilingual course is offered for the first time, shows the opening-up of the Philosophy Studies Program of FernUniversity for students whose mother tongue is not German. I should like to thank Ulrike Müller-Bruhnke MA for her support in proof-reading the typoscript of this course.

Hagen, May 2003

Prof. J. P. Beckmann

#### Vorwort

Kein Philosophieren kann heute der Auseinandersetzung mit Fragen und Problemen des Empirismus ausweichen. Der vorliegende Kurs des Philosophen und Wissenschaftstheoretikers Prof. van Fraassen von der Universität Princeton zeigt dies auf paradigmatische Weise. So bestand denn auch kein Zweifel, dass dieser seit vielen Jahren bewährte Kurs in das Programm der neuen Studiengänge aufzunehmen war. Dass dies erstmals zweisprachig geschieht, zeigt die Öffnung des Philosophie-Studienangebots der FernUniversität für fremdsprachige Studierende. Für die tatkräftige redaktionelle Mithilfe sei Ulrike Müller-Bruhnke MA herzlich gedankt.

Hagen, im Mai 2003

Prof. J.P. Beckmann

Diese Seite bleibt aus technischen Gründen frei!

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TEIL II: DEUTSCHE ÜBERSETZUNG

### 0. Introduction

### 0.1 Introduction to the Theme

At the beginning of a course on modern empiricism, we may wish to reflect on why we should want to turn to philosophy in general, or to this specific philosophical tradition in particular. It is possible to do so with exactly the same motive that leads one to study history or geography or literary criticism, namely to satisfy our curiosity about the development of ideas and intellectual activities that shaped our culture. This would be a passive approach, a decision to learn and be receptive, as opposed to a wish to participate. And philosophy makes a constant demand for participation. It is true that philosophers present you with theses and arguments and answers. But if you look at how they react to the theses and arguments their predecessors presented, you see that their practice undercuts their presentation of their ideas. On the face of it, a teacher of philosophy should be understood simultaneously as saying "Here is my position and here are my reasons for it: I advocate its acceptance" and also as saying "Here I show you my practice as philosopher, and hope to make clear why I value this practice: I advocate its imitation." But to imitate his practice will consist in approaching his ideas very critically, as a subject for your own evaluation, which may lead to very different conclusions – the very opposite of acceptance.

How is this paradox to be resolved? Well, if I presented you now with a way to resolve this paradox, I would be giving a philosophical answer to a philosophical question. So I would at once be offering this to you as the solution thought ought to be accepted; and inviting you to approach it critically, as a possible answer for you to evaluate. To be aware of this tension – that is to have a better understanding of the problem than any individual solution can give you. You are hereby invited, as you study this course, to keep this tension alive, by thinking critically about every thesis and argument presented.

In empiricism, we have a philosophical tradition which has always valued the critical practice of philosophy more than any answers this practice might provide. Hence empiricist philosophers have almost never been "system builders"; they have been the critics of philosophical systems. Yet no criticism of someone else's answers is effective unless you can do one of two things: (a) show that the questions he addresses were based on a mistake, or (b) suggest alternative answers that are better. Since (a) is not always possible, empiricists too have had to devise their own answers and philosophical positions. In section 1 we will look at the common elements in empiricist philosophical positions. The remaining sections will describe – in a critical and evaluative, i.e. philosophical manner – how those positions developed during modern times (mainly from the seventeenth century to the present).

The approach to philosophy: curiosity, participation, criticism, evaluation, understanding of the problem Method of study of the humanities, historical and analytical The method of study adopted is therefore typical of the humanities: the approach is at once historical and analytical. This is how you would, for example, study literary criticism, beginning with Aristotle's *Poetics*, investigating why and how Cicero and Longinus introduced changes into this theory, why these classical theories could not do justice to new literary forms emerging since the Renaissance, and so forth.

But the branch of learning outside philosophy of most concern to empiricists has always been natural science. In some broad sense, in both science and philosophy, we are trying to reach an understanding of the world we live in. But the quest for understanding takes many forms.

One form is the mechanic's or engineer's question, how does it work? Exactly the same curiosity leads the scientist to ask, how does the embryo develop into a mature organism? and leads the philosopher to ask, how does the scientist reach and evaluate his own theories? These are all factual questions, which cannot be answered entirely by "armchair thinking". At the same time, knowing the facts is often not enough to reach understanding. Sometimes understanding is hindered by a lack of facts, but sometimes by a lack of reflection.

In the natural sciences we see a large scale cultural phenomenon, an enterprise that has many participants all over the world, and which involves both the collection of factual information and much speculative thought. During the last four centuries, partly through its association with powerful technologies, and partly through its intellectual challenges, science has become a major cultural force. By precept and example it transformed certain parts of the humanities into social sciences, and changed the methods of trade, production, business, and government. But in addition, in the purely intellectual sphere, its theories and world-pictures now present the challenges to understanding that myths, metaphysics, and theologies used to present.

This exploration of modern empiricism, a tradition in Western philosophy, will therefore take the form of a study of philosophical reflections on science.

## 0.2 Overview of the Course

This course on modern empiricism will explain what distinguishes empiricism among modern philosophical traditions. First it will concentrate on the development of philosophical reflections on science through the middle of the nineteenth century, and the impact of the scientific revolutions that took place thereafter in biology and physics.

Chapter 2

Chapter 1

The course will then concentrate on the subsequent development of empiricism in the twentieth century, and provide an introduction to current problems and debates. The second chapter discusses the nature of epistemology (literally, "the theory of knowledge"). It traces the development of empiricist epistemology from the critique of Aristotelian induction, through Cartesian and

A study of philosophical reflections on science

Newtonian methodology, to the emergence of a methodological synthesis in the nineteenth century.

In the third chapter, after a brief introduction to the modern concepts of theory and model, we provide capsule introductions to three scientific revolutions: Darwin's theory of evolution, Einstein's theory of relativity, and the new quantum-mechanics. These will provide three concrete examples – in addition to the smaller examples of experiments and hypotheses provided along the way – of philosophically significant scientific developments.

Chapter 3

Chapter Four deals with the thoroughgoing critique of traditional epistemology of science at the hands of Pierre Duhem, Karl Popper, and Hans Reichenbach.

Chapter 4

Chapter Five approaches the question – following Hempel and Salmon –, what is meant by (scientific) explanations. This approach primary centers around the terms of information and causal relations, and finally ends in a theory of questioning, refering to Bromberger, which tries to grasp explanations as replies to the question-type of the why-question, and thus as an act depending on a certain context.

Chapter 5

Chapter Six describes the development of an approach to scientific method which focuses on the concept of *probability* as the key to the notion of rational belief. This development which started in the nineteenth century, was developed in the twentieth by Keynes, Ramsey, Carnap, and Hempel. While there are differences among these philosophers, they share common disagreements with those discussed in the preceding chapter. It is not possible to do equal justice to all philosophical pursuits so near to the present.

Chapter 6

But the seventh chapter will outline one possible empiricist resolution of the philosophical problems that emerged in the preceding chapters. In keeping with the empiricist tradition, this chapter will focus on a re-evaluation of the place and character of science.

Chapter 7