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with the support of Niels Weidtmann

# Philosophy of Interculturality

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*Identität – Differenz, Selbstheit – Fremdheit. Interkulturelle und globale Herausforderungen. Philosophische Annäherungen*, ed. by G. Stenger/N. Weidtmann, „Studien zur Interkulturellen Philosophie“, Nordhausen 2014 (in press).

Coeditor (together with R. A. Mall, H. R. Yousefi i.a.) of the series „*Interkulturelle Bibliothek*“, Nordhausen 2004 ff., hitherto 135 vols. published (editorship 2006-2008).

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- „Übersetzen übersetzen. Zur Phänomenologie des Übersetzens“, in: J. Renn/J. Straub, S. Shimada (eds.), *Übersetzung als Medium des Kulturverstehens und sozialer Integration*, Frankfurt/M. 2002, pp. 93-122.
- „Phänomenologische Methode und Interkulturelle Philosophie“, in: N. Schneider/R.A. Mall et al. (eds.), *Einheit und Vielfalt. Das Verstehen der Kulturen, Studien zur interkulturellen Philosophie*, vol. 9, Amsterdam/Atlanta 1998, pp. 167-182.
- „Interkulturelle Kommunikation. Diskussion – Dialog – Gespräch“, in: N. Schneider et al. (ed.), *Philosophie aus interkultureller Sicht, Studien zur interkulturellen Philosophie*, vol. 7, Amsterdam/Atlanta 1997, pp. 289-315.
- „Hermeneutik der Welt – Hermetik der Welten“ (German and Korean.), in: *Philosophical Hermeneutics* (Journal of Korea Society for Hermeneutics), Korea 1997, 255-316.
- „Intercultural Thinking – A Question of Dimension and Dimensions“, in: G. D’Souza (ed.), *Interculturality of Philosophy and Religion*, Bangalore (India) 1996, pp. 58-72.
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„Postkoloniale Identitätssuche. Die innerkulturellen Krisen und der interkulturelle Dialog“, in: C. Hamann/C. Sieber (eds.), *Zur Aktualität des Postkolonialen*, Hildesheim 2002, pp. 109-124.  
„Der gemeinsame Weg der Kulturen zu größerer Wahrheit. Eine Einführung in das Denken von Kwasi Wiredu“, in: *Polylog. Zeitschrift für interkulturelles Philosophieren*. Vol. 2, Wien 1998, pp. 6-11.

## Chapter I: Introduction to the Question and Method

### Unit 1: Introduction

#### 1. Posing of the Question and Research Task

The Notion of  
“Philosophy”

“Philosophy” is not a homogenous concept. With every philosophical conception the debate over what philosophy is and what she is all about is revived. And still, in the course of its history, basic features have emerged, establishing themselves as possible horizons and paths of thought to which one can take recourse and upon which one can rely with good reason. Even if philosophical thought has branched out into various disciplines with certain areas of inquiry, if schools have formed that in turn are rooted in certain traditions, and even if these often have nothing at all to say to each other, they all agree that philosophy reaches from the Greeks through the Christian and Arabian Middle Ages, through modernity to the present day. Regardless of what intellectual innovations and revolutions take place, the basis of categories and basic concepts has remained more or less steadfast. Philosophy is of Western, European, occidental origin and at the same time is considered universal, naming the foundation and fundamental prerequisite for human self-understanding and -communication. This consciousness remains upheld, with few exceptions, until the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, but is becoming ever more questionable, crumbling more and more with the onset of new challenges. On the one hand, universal validity, formal structure and the claim to truth are indispensable; on the other, their cultural belongingness, which support the content structure and contextually bound relativisation, cannot be ignored. The question, then, is how these two viewpoints stand to one another, whether they can be traced back to one another, whether and how they condition each other or whether they be not mutually exclusive.

Conflict between  
the “Philosophies of  
the Cultures”

Now this interwovenness takes on a quite special topicality under intercultural auspices: other, i.e. non-European cultures not only have their own philosophies, but with these claims are made that call the hegemony of Western thought critically into question. Connected herewith are not only philosophical and academic discourses on the relevancy and significance of each of the philosophies, e.g. wherein their variabilities and invariances consist, but therein can also be found signs of the other fully different understandings of life and existence, the entirely differently oriented modes of experience and horizons of thought. This hitherto more or less distinctly apparent difference between the great cultural circles – one need only consider the Asian, European, Arabic-Muslim and African cultures – holds an obvious trigger for conflict between the cultures that practically compels them for the sake of their own self-communication to a confrontation with each other culture. More closely considered, this critical confrontation presents itself as a conflict between the “philosophies of the cultures”. Yet what can then lay claim to validity, when each set of fundamental *philosophical* principles is in question?

With this diagnosis coincides a further interwovenness, namely that between theory and practice, which at once seems paradoxical: even if there is more interest in the scientific research of foreign cultures and other life-worlds than ever before in human history, a glance at the political reality appears to show the opposite. Throughout the world bitter wars are waged that stubbornly resist any rational comprehension, but that, in their social, religious, and ethnic connotations, refer back to their cultural background. If these bellicose conflicts are not simply to be dismissed as hegemonial, territorial and power-political practices of subjugation, although these certainly describe at least one aspect, one must allow the question from whence this hatred and this violence come. What leads men at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century to murder and wipe out members of other peoples, nations, religions and cultures for reasons of their belonging to the same? Simple explanations that the others be enemies and terrorists who lack elementary prerequisites of human cohabitation, being less advanced in human development, increase this hatred more than they promote a more peaceful future. Now an answer must be found to these incisive, paradoxical dilemmas, and it appears to me that this can only prove possible by philosophical means. Politics can only ever be an application of already presupposed structures of thought and experience, and hence can at best react to states and situations that are by no means decided or clarified in their foundations. For the sake of philosophical obligations and responsibilities, we cannot duck this task today, for, after all, basic philosophical research has always stood under the primacy of reason's self-clarification from the very beginning, and thus that of the self-illumination of real human existence. But philosophy would be too abbreviated, in a sense, if her concern were understood as a direct instance of application or as the mere formation of theories; according to her fundamental intentions, she has always contained more. By confronting certain entanglements, self-contradictions, dead ends or even mere insufficiencies or mere limitations with recourse to the history of her genesis and long development, she has been able to draft new models that promised orientation for the near future: orientation for philosophy herself with respect to her own foundations, as well as orientation vis-à-vis factual givens, i.e. reality.

Interwovenness  
between Theory and  
Practice

Interculturally motivated thought will therefore always have to move in the field of tension between of theory and practice, and in no case will be able to avoid opening philosophy beyond her encasement of theoretical drafts, constructs and exegeses. This thought, like the Greek of his own day, but also like the Indian and Chinese thinkers from time immemorial is concerned with the unseparatedness and the reciprocal insemination of life and thought, experience and reflection. Only *therein* do the cultures experience themselves as addressed, as taken seriously in their own right, and acknowledged as equal partners.

Intercultural  
Thought in the Field  
of Tension between  
Theory and Practice

“Intercultural philosophy” cannot be classified according to the scheme familiar to us through such appellations as “analytical”, “hermeneutical”, “dialectical philosophy” and so forth. With her rather a “philosophy of interculturality” comes forth, which at once, as an “interculturality of philosophy” not only relativizes the Occidentally oriented notion of philosophy, but seeks to understand philosophy

“Intercultural  
Philosophy”

and culturality from out of their mutually fertilizing occurrence of constitution.

Challenge of  
Intercultural  
Thought

Both these aspects, the transcendence of traditional, continentally marked notions of philosophy, and the attentiveness to the constitutive conditioning structures and general processes of each connex of philosophy and culture, join in the actual challenge of intercultural thought: how is it possible to confront the difference and plurality of cultures in such a way that these are neither razed, or “overcome”, nor founded upon an absolute difference that yields cultural enclaves and self-absolutizations? In positive terms: is there a “dialogue of cultural worlds” in which their difference is experienced as a challenge fruitful for all parties concerned, in which only from out of the encounter is the real “world character” of these worlds discovered and promoted? Have not the great world cultures precisely by providing, each in its own way, their own, incomparable fundamental possibilities for the whole of humanity, therefore the right, to receive undivided support? And this not before the background of folkloric self-portrayal, or even socio-cultural hybrids, but for reasons of their energetic contribution, which they make, or undertake to make for all humanity and thus also for a greater and more developed humanum? Can all this seriously be dispensed with, or is an increased consciousness of this constellation and the mutual working out of the culture worlds *qua* “worlds” not also the condition for a sensible and auspicious confrontation of such manifestations as xenophobia, hatred of foreigners, immigration- and integration problems? Cultural assimilation remains just as ineffective, unrealistic and, in consequence, inhumane as the ideas of multi-cultural societies. Both lack the insight into the positivity and fruitfulness of that formative power that is released when someone is addressed with respect to his “world” and taken seriously in this world.

Interculturality as a  
New Challenge of  
Reason

Now such an understanding of philosophy as an interculturally grounded philosophy indeed treads new ground insofar as the new focus is on methodical-systematical expansions and deepenings, as well as a turn towards other cultural horizons and worlds. This double task of cultural-contextual analyses and universally laid groundwork will prove unavoidable in the near future for *philosophical* reasons. But both sides must be drawn from each other and profile themselves with one another. One cannot have the one without the other. Should one do this all the same, it would reveal nothing less than the lack of intercultural consciousness. It is no mere coincidence that precisely at that point at which these two poles drift apart and become independent – and this image is confirmed all too well by the present practice of philosophy and the individual sciences –, intercultural thought is not recognized in its necessity. One is doing either philosophy or cultural and social science. The results and clarifications yielded by the one side are irrelevant for the other, and so each side accuses the other of incompetency. Yet the intercultural discourse is not being held, and interculturality as a new challenge of reason itself remains just as unrecognized as the restrictions connected with it.

Intercultural thought as a new research area of philosophy accordingly ought not to be understood merely as an additional philosophical discipline, but moreover as a critique of the hitherto prevalent understanding of philosophy. Now there are already diverse approaches to this, and wherein mine differs from the others is the insight into the *course* of philosophical thinking itself, a conscious account of which I regard as indispensable. Intercultural philosophy distinguishes herself sharply from Western, European thought no more than it unquestioningly and uncritically accepts its paradigms; it rather attempts to take it up in its evidences and principles in such a way that both its inward self-limitation and its outward boundary become visible. It is, so to speak, not due to external givens, but out of inner necessity that philosophy comes to a philosophy of interculturality. In other words: the inner crisis of the notion of philosophy also makes us sensitive to the philosophical comprehension of cultural differences.

Intercultural Thought as a New Research Area of Philosophy

The time has thus come for intercultural consciousness and thought real politically, and their relevancy to diagnoses of the present is to be acknowledged insofar as philosophy is always also an answer to the queries of her time. Again, I see this impression fortified in that philosophy herself, through her own development, runs up against her own European, Western boundaries, so that the step to an interculturally founded understanding of philosophy is a natural consequence of philosophy herself. Just as with Kant a philosophical consequence of thought itself manifested itself in transcendental philosophy, as from Hegel to Dilthey and Heidegger thought became conscious of its own historicity, as through the various philosophical schools of the 20<sup>th</sup> century the consciousness-philosophical paradigm was replaced by phenomenological and hermeneutical, through pragmatist and analytical, through structuralist and poststructuralist processes of understanding and experience, intercultural thought appears to me to brave the next step. It is concerned with the consistent, i.e. taking up old paradigms, but critical continuation just as with the step beyond Europe as the ideal philosophical way connected with this. The project hence has a double connotation: it proceeds from philosophically immanent, systematic claims on the one hand, and on the other it attempts to suffice to the universal demand of reason by taking its principles from out of the plurality of culture worlds and replacing them back into the same.

Philosophy as an Answer to the Questions of Her Time

## 2. Universalism and/or Relativism, Globalisation and/or Regionalisation?

The old, constantly harrowing question of metaphysics how the relation of unity and plurality, generality and specificity is to be thought returns today in the secular keywords globalisation/universalism and regionalisation/relativism. Even if the terms have shifted, a similar problem is transported in the matter itself. Universalism is already accompanied by the unity theorem implicitly, which always sorts and categorises all multiplicities and alterities already, allowing for their comparison with each other and allowing them to appear in the “multiplicity

Universalism and Relativism in a Cultural Context

of their voices". In the cultural context this means that all cultures are different apparent images finally rooted in a universal culture consciousness, or aiming at this as at a goal pattern. Relativism appears to occupy the opposite position, being connected to the so-called "incommensurability thesis", according to which every culture can only be understood in itself and is hence incomparable and incompatible with others. The unanswered question of every relativism is readily apparent, for the theorem of incomparability already presupposes comparability. It has itself already always referred to other, in principle to every other, from which it receives its autonomy in the first place. A universalism, it must be noted, already inheres in relativism, only with a relativistic twist. Universalism, on the other hand, is dependent upon the relative modes of appearance in order to be able to test and anticipate its universal criterion at all. It counts on relativisms from the start, but has already subjected them to its universal principle from the very beginning. Each has already presupposed the other in its own inception, the one time from the one side, and the other from the other. Their mutual interdependence is obvious, yet their bases, and thus also both their cognitive principles stand in diametrical opposition to one another.

Globalisation and/or  
Regionalisation

Now this constellation reappears in the questions of globalisation and/or regionalisation, universalisation and/or contextualisation. The philosophical-conceptual efforts toward unity and plurality with all their difficulties and paradoxes appear to have taken their place as self-evident in the present globalisation debates. Once the conflict is fought out at the political level between globalisation proponents and opponents, the wide gap between "poor" and "rich" playing an integral role, the position reveals itself in intercultural terms to be somewhat more complex. It is foremost individual states, regions, ethnic groups that demand their right to cultural identity and freedom to unfold and develop, and force this claim, if necessary, even to the ultimate extent of strategic conflict. Whether it be the ethnic tribal feuds in Africa, the ethnic-religious background of the Balkan wars, the territorial-religiously rooted, perennial Arab-Israeli war, the conflicts between the world powers led on by the USA and the Arab League, the conflicts between India and Pakistan, that apparently "eternal" hatred between Catholics and Protestants in northern Ireland or other like conflicts, the problem appears to be solved neither by accusations of the opposing side of terrorism and fundamentalism nor by the institution of a world power, encompassing all parties, to care for reason, peace and order. What already proves an extremely precarious situation politically by no means loses its paradoxical position when examined culturally and philosophically.

Anthropological-  
Cultural Precondi-  
tions Lend Man His  
Self-Understanding

The insistence on self-reliance and regional-territorial unfolding of the cultures naturally has its reasons. One only understands a culture and its view of man once one has understood its inner connections, its "con-text", i.e. once one knows the "necessity" to think, to feel and to act in such and such a way. Only this anthropological-cultural connection lends man the self-understanding that he has *qua* man. This means that human being is only possible on the ground of an anthropological-cultural prerequisite that will always be determined with respect



to its definite content. It is also *herein* that man finds his universality, which cannot be put on from just any random source whatsoever. One is not “man as such”, plus these and those accoutrements, but understands oneself as Frank, as Bavarian, as German, as European, as Cosmopolitan, which always requires a concrete mediation. The accusation levelled by proponents of regionalism and relativism toward the globalists and universalists consists in part, then, in that one passes judgment on someone and something that one does not even know. Each individual cultural body sees itself undermined, in any case, in most cases not even perceived, much less understood. One has not understood the person, although one claims and even believes the contrary. Wherever this process, which is experienced as oppression and tyranny, takes place, the way is paved for that fundamental conflict, which, as many cases show, can lead to violence and war. That this can be no solution is clear enough by now; but that a universal message of peace, albeit imperative, cannot be any real solution either if it is pronounced over people’s heads without any consideration for their individual culturally grounded self-understanding is also becoming clear, though only gradually. For cultures see themselves not understood in this very regard, and the suspicion even presents itself that the recourse to a call to peace connected with universal reason itself may be rooted in a *certain quite specific* cultural self-understanding.

The state of affairs appears indeed paradoxical: every relativism and every regionalism is marked by a universalistic aspiration that may reach from a certain feeling of self-worth (“we French”, “we Alsatians”, “we Germans” etc.) to a self-absolutizing and totalitarianising (“Am deutschen Wesen soll die Welt genesen” [By Teutonic zeal shall the world be healed]). Every universalism and every globalism believes it already has this tendency firmly under control by portraying them all as relative apparent forms of one and the same humanity. It claims to represent “humanity as a whole”, not noticing that this itself is, or at least can be, a form of self-absolutizing. Even if one purports to argue “in the name of reason”, closer scrutiny reveals these argumentative figures to be subject to relative referentiality, and especially under cultural premises, relative reasons. Universalism is thus more relative than it is capable of perceiving. There appears to be no way out of this dilemma.

Thus the real confrontations, of which we have just spoken, persist. The universalism-relativism-theorems falter, in a sense, at the difference of cultures arising with the intercultural question, a fundamental difference which only appears once one has occupied oneself with the study of their fundamental constitutiva. The opposition of universalism and relativism sacrifice penetrating power, just as well-meaning attempts to put them together and inclusive determinations of their relation sacrifice persuasive power. The cultural differences cannot thus be grasped, neither with respect to their negative, i.e. mutually exclusive, moments nor with respect to their positive, mutually supportive possibilities. In any case they seem unequal to the standards of an intercultural critique.

In the face of the intercultural situation as a whole, the foundations and prerequisites of reason must be renegotiated. The indication of their all-encompassing

Paradox of Relativism/Regionalism and Universalism/Globalism

Failure of the Universalism and Relativism Theorems

Dialogue of Worlds

universality alone no longer suffices. Thus the discussion of modernity and postmodernity has already drawn attention to the first confusion of the concepts of reason themselves. Postmodern theories, which also strive toward a plurality or multiplicity of reason, however, achieve at best a distinction of diverse types of rationality, which remain *within* a discursive notion of reason. Principally, the postmodern only reacts to a changed feeling of life, and only in certain areas, but its arguments are built exactly according to the rationality patterns of modernity. An intercultural consciousness, on the other hand, is supposed to see this notion of reason of the modern/postmodern itself as a certain type of reason, but by no means the only type. Hence “reason in the plural” means more than mere plurality within reason – this is a comparatively trivial result –, on the intercultural scale the much more difficult question arises of a “plurality of worlds”, which regards as its task the exploration of the plurality of cognitive and experiential worlds. In *this* sense a “dialogue of worlds” comes into focus in which the “worldly” of an individual culture can open itself up only through the encounter. To this end a mutual critique and correction is needed, whose ideal is that each perceive the other as a *culture* in the first place, confront it, become better acquainted and learn to appreciate one another better. To the extent to which this is successful they notice their “in common”, whose “specialness” consists precisely in that every culture gains a deeper, and thus better, understanding of itself. So universality stands not directly opposed to relativity, nor universalism against contextualism, no more than any of their hybrid forms can prove suitable. Only the occurrence of productive disputation, in more general terms, the dialogue of worlds yields and promotes each party’s self-clarification. No culture is ever completely with itself, but is always in motion and experiences itself as an occurrence of replying to the challenges of others.

Universalism, Fundamentalism and the Dialogue of Plural Worlds

Considering the possible consequences of the painful, bellicose and even deadly antagonism of universalism and fundamentalism that can come from the unclear points and the paradoxes of the universalism-relativism-theorems, or of the globalisation-regionalisation-constellations, the “dialogue of plural worlds” appears to me indeed a veritable fundamental possibility, being a humane one. For under closer scrutiny fundamentalism is revealed to be a covert universalism, which would force the validity of its own matter and conviction on all. Conversely universalism as well proves to be a disguised fundamentalism inasmuch as here too *one* option is taken for the only option for all. The European understanding of reason had never been doubted, only through the basic intercultural situation, which is gradually emerging as the future situation of human being, do ever more voices become audible that also point out the boundaries of *this* hitherto valid rationality in its claim to sole validity. We will undertake to point out these boundaries here, at least with respect to certain parameters, in a philosophical way and thus pertaining to the field of philosophical thought.

Plurality

Plurality cannot be taken to mean that one could take a new position above all the plural constitutions, nor that one could grasp plurality in this sense from one standpoint or locus. Its meaning could rather consist in an understanding of the



cultural confrontation as an *experiential occurrence* of back and forth, of transition and return, inasmuch as this reveals interculturality as a signum of man. From out of this can only come that fundamental theme of *attitude* which is always called for in the context of intercultural encounters – the manifestations of xenophobia and of cultural indifference come readily to mind –, and which is by no means already guaranteed by being demanded for the sake of universal morality and normative justification. So the intercultural consciousness works at an expansion and a deepening of reason itself; indeed this constitutes, so to speak, its innermost aspiration.

## Summary

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By the word “philosophy” a Western, European, Occidental thought is usually meant that coincides with a claim to universal validity, and thus universal authority. This consciousness remains intact, with few exceptions, even unto the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, but is becoming ever more questionable and brittle due to new challenges on a global scale that transcend this horizon. It is becoming ever clearer that, with the voices of non-European cultures and their philosophies, other claims are made that call the hegemony of Western thought critically into question. Aside and along with their philosophical and academic discourses the completely other understandings of life and existence, just as the entirely differently arranged modes of experience, horizons of thought and life-worlds are becoming obviously apparent. This leads to the effect that the cultures and thought worlds must accept each other much more than ever before, even entering into a mutually critical exchange, nor shying away from conflicts, for in the process of an explicit self-understanding no less is at stake than the work of clarifying each party’s fundamental *philosophical* principles. Real-politically, socially, culturally and religiously impregnated self-understandings and practices that are often marked by images of hatred and animosity to which one usually thinks the only possible reaction to be that of war, cannot obscure the fact that our concern here must be with a responsibility and obligation that pertains to all humanity, to whose treatment and solution it is most especially philosophy that must make a contribution. Philosophy conducts both theoretical and practical basic research, and, where the entire global situation is at issue, with all its aspirations, claims and demands, which pertain to fundamental concepts and understandings, and which cannot be traced back to one another, she is called upon to further an intercultural orientation of philosophy herself.

Interculturally motivated thought will always have to manifest itself in the field of interplay between theory and practice. In no case will it be able to avoid opening philosophy up beyond her encasement of theoretical blueprints, constructs and mere exegeses, which also means connecting the levels of life and thought, experience and reflection in a constructive way with each other. Only thus can cultures experience themselves as addressed in their own right, taken seriously and acknowledged as equal partners. The focus of a “philosophy of intercultural-

lity” is hence directed toward a “dialogue of cultural worlds”, in which their difference is experienced as a mutual challenge fruitful for all, a challenge to be articulated with philosophical argumentation and insight. So there appears the far from simple task of connecting cultural-contextual analyses with universally conceived foundational work, which also requires new attributions between “culturality” and self-reflexive rationality. Intercultural thought as a comparatively new philosophical research area ought be understood accordingly not only as an additional philosophical discipline, but therebeyond as a critique of how philosophy has hitherto been understood. The project hence takes on a double connotation: it arises out of the systematic demands within philosophy herself, and it attempts to suffice to the universal claim of reason by drawing its foundations out of the plurality of culture worlds and replacing them there.

In the frame of intercultural communication, philosophical, but also social theoretical and cultural scientific debates that devote themselves to those issues connected with the notional “hinges” “universalism and/or relativism”, “globalisation and/or regionalisation” are usually characterised by pleas for either-or or both-and. Though good reasons for these positions can be cited, they are still hardly sufficient to the standard of a “critique of intercultural reason” as it is here proposed. The main reason for this diagnosis draws on the conclusion that with this conceptual inventory the obvious cultural differences cannot be grasped, neither with respect to their negative, i.e. mutually excluding moments, nor with respect to their positive, i.e. mutually supportive possibilities. Therefore, a “thinking of plurality” is suggested that proceeds from a “reason in the plural”, in which the difficult challenge of a possible “plurality of worlds” is to be faced, which sees the exploration of the plurality of worlds of thought and of experience as its task. That cultures, however they may be grasped or more exactly defined, are never entirely with themselves, that they find themselves constantly in a process of themselves, and this especially in exchange and reciprocal having-to-answer and the will-to-answer to each challenge by others, all this is indicative of their intrinsic dynamics, which in turn constitute them *as* cultures. To the extent to which this productive and promoting occurrence of interaction and exchange succeeds, inwardly and outwardly, do the culture worlds notice their “in-common”, whose “specialness” in turn consists precisely in that each culture gains a better, because deeper, understanding of itself. Only this makes it possible for them to enlighten themselves about themselves. Hence, it would be erroneous to aspire to occupy a certain locus beyond the plural constitutions, just as one could never grasp plurality from one single standpoint. Plurality in the sense suggested here is aimed at a comprehension of cultural exchanges as *experiential occurrences* between the cultures, as a back and forth, a transition and return, for only thereby – according to the thesis – can “interculturality” emerge as a signum of man himself, which can be seen again in those human and personal fundamental themes of *attitude*, *stance* and the like.

**Practice Exercises****Practice Exercises**

1. In what does the special question of a “philosophy of interculturality” consist?
2. What would be her most important research tasks?
3. What is her attitude toward an understanding of philosophy that, in general, is only oriented toward the “West”? What arguments are there for this?
4. Do universalism and relativism constitute opposite projects, do they condition one another, or do they exclude one another? Do they suffice to the demands of a “philosophy of interculturality”?
5. How is the discourse on a “reason in plural” connected with that of a “plurality of worlds”?